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It IS proposed to show that there IS one great prmctple underlymg all the operauons of war,-a prmctple whmh must be followed m all good combmatrons wnh few exceptions, the most brilhant successes and the greatest reverses resulted from an adherence to thrs pnncrple m the one case, and from a neglect of rt m the other ' -Baron Antome Hem Jomm, The Art of War
Efforts were made to equip the conduct of war wxth prmctples, rules, or even systems Thrs did present a posmve goal, but people farled to take adequate account of the endless complexmes mvolved The conduct of war branches out m almost all drrechons and has no definitrve hmns * -Cd von Cimsewt2f, On War
Ifthere can be such a thmg as a Joke in mllnary hrstory, surely a small one IS the behef that with the posthumous pubhcatron of Clausewnz m the 1?33Os, On War became the btble of the Prussnu~ army, the source of then great vrctones of 1566 and IS70, and soon thereafter the chief mrhtary theory of the Western world 3 -John Shy, "Jomrm," m Makers of -Modern Strategy
The begmmng of the 19* Century was a time of profound upheaval The French
Revolution unleashed the power of a "people numerous and armed" upon the nations of Europe Napoleon harnessed that power to the nascent Scientific, Industrial, and
Agrrcultural Revolutions and created a new mode of warfare Durmg and immediately after the Napoleonic Wars, polrtrcal and military thmkers of all natrons and positions faced the challenge of understandmg and adaptmg to Napoleon's methods Out of the ranks emerged two semmal thmkers whose theorres remam mfluential almost 200 years later -Antome Hem-i Jormm and Carl von Clausevvltz As the quotes above rllustrate, they approached the analysis of military success from strikmgly different frames of reference And it is an irony of mstory that while Clausewnz's work is still studied almost umversally, rt IS the mostly-ignored Jomrm who's Influence, while quote subtle, 1s more pervasive Jomrm essentially won the battle for poster@ because hrs frame of reference, and thus his methodology and conclusrons, was more attuned to the mode of thmkmg dominant m both hrs ume and the present Jomrman formulatrons such as "prmcrples of war" and "mass upon the decrsrve pomt" have dommated m&ary tbmkmg m general because they fit the framework of the dominant, or root metaphor of Western thmkmg. In stnct terms, a metaphor LS "the apphcatron of a word or phrase to an obJect or concept it does not literally denote, m order to suggest comparrson wrth another obJect or concept '+I A m metaphor IS such a comparrson whrch provrdes the foundation for an entrre plulosophy or school of thought
The root metaphor of Western thmkmg IS linear reductromsm -the assumptron that outcomes follow proportronally from inputs and the screntrfic method of understandmg complex systems or problems by breakmg them mto their component parts Lmearrty has served for over 250 years as the root metaphor because of rts apparent power to explain the workings of the world Jomrm tapped mto that apparent power when he applied the linear reductromst methodology to the analysrs of warfare He emphasized the known or knowable as the key Thus, vrctory was no longer a mystenous accident or the product of unfathomable gemus Rather, rt resulted from the correct apphcatron of smple prmcrples &scermble when one analyzed warfare "screntrfically " There was, however, always a recogmtron that some aspects of human experrence, mcludmg some aspects of warfare,
were not knowable or amenable to scientrfic analysts -that there were, m fact, nonlmear aspects that could not be explamed usmg the lmear metaphor Clauseurltz is the theonst who captured the essence of those uncertamues In contrast to Jonnm, he emphasrzed the effects of chance m warfare His magnum opus, On War, is filled wrth the recogmtron of what today we call nonhnearrues -the capacity of the actions of the most msigmficant mdivldual to lead to srgmficant results, and the mabihty to understand events completely or predict outcomes accurately Today, new, nonlinear sciences5 are finally opemng a wrndow of understandmg on these nonlinear aspects of warfare, as well as other arenas of human endeavor A number of scientrsts, mathematrcians, and theoreticians have taken the first steps m applymg nonlinearity toward an improved understandmg of war This work has proceeded for the past ten to fifteen years, but has generally been applied m discrete topic areas such as modeling or sunulations
The nonlinear sciences are proving to be qmte useful m these arenas, but their true power lies in their potential to broaden our entire basis for understandmg the nature of war Clausewnz's mtumons provide a firm foundation, and the nonlmear sciences provide a means to extend hts mtumon mto the present and expand upon it -perhaps ultnnately to create a "neoClausewnzian" nonlinear theory of war Tins paper examines the linear metaphor which has guided Western mihtary thmkmg and compares it to the inherent nonlmearmes of warfare m all its dimensrons It thus makes the case for discardmg the linear metaphor m favor of a new root metaphor of nonlmearny These thoughts are intended as a first step toward that ultrmate goal of a nonlinear theory of
The Root Metaphor
The idea of metaphor 1s far richer than connoted by a simple defimtron
Metaphors are a conceptually powerful means of thought which provide tmphcit structure to much of human reallty. 6 We budget time, and analyze the tune-value of money, we picture highways as arteries of commerce, and arteries as highways for the body's nutrients, the movements of the solar system become the workings of a giant clockwork machine, and the movements of sub-atomic partrcles are visualized as planets in a tmy solar system "'Metaphor constitutes a ubiquitous, irreducibly complex aspect of any natural language -Metaphors are imbedded throughout our speech patterns [They are powerful] "indicators of networks of meaning "' People would be hard-pressed to commumcate without using metaphors, and there are &fferent levels of metaphor use
The level applicable to thts discussion IS metaphor as a umtary view -"a symbohc relation that umtes the paradigmatic way of vrewmg an entire field of knowledge," often represented by a particular term 8 In thrs paper, the label "root metaphor" indicates thrs type of unitary view Lmeanty is the umtary view, the root metaphor, of Western thmking It is ubiquitous m our vlsuahzatron of the way the world works As Foreign Service Officer Steven Mann notes, "%Iumans have a terrific need for stability and one of the ways we serve this need is through the search for paradigms We consider reality tamed if we find a classification, a description for rt "' We have created stab&y and understandmg through the metaphor of the world as a giant, clockwork machme governed by linear relationships
Lmearrtv as Metanhor
To categorrze a system or a relatronshrp as lmear IS to imply two condrtrons The first IS that changes m system input result m pronortronal changes m system output In other words, small changes m outcome are the result of small changes m mpt; and srmrlarly, large changes m mputs result m large changes m outcomes Thrs means that linear systems tend to be stable, because relatrvely small changes in input wrll not cause the systems to go "out of control " Fmily, rt also means that exact knowledge of inputs leads to exact knowledge of outputs The second condrtron of lmearrty IS that of addtrvrty -simply put, the whole equals the sum of rts parts Therefore, understandmg of the system, or a problem, 1s gamed by breakmg rt mto rts mdrvrdual parts, analyzmg the parts, and then reassembhng the whole In other words, two plus two alwavs equals four, and thrs 1s true because one plus one plus one plus one equals four In order to understand and, more rmportantly, control the system, we keep breakmg rt down until we find parts that are basic enough to understand and control -at whrch point we can understand and control the reassembled mtermedrate parts, and then the whole lo
The power of the linear metaphor 1s the power of explanatron The Screntrfic
Revolutron seemmgly created the capability to understand the world -by breakmg larger entrues mto constituent parts and analyzing the (assumed) lmear mteractrons between them, screntrsts could predrct the outcome of those mteractrons Indeed, the very defimnon of science came to mean thrs method of understandmg the whole by understandmg its parts, and the epitome of understandmg was screntrfic understanding
The natural outcome was an attempt to gam screntrfic understanding m all fields of study, mcludmg the social sciences l1 mechamstically -a grant machme amenable to understanding through understandmg of its constituent parts, the parts to be understood through observation and described m the language of mathematics -and the whole amenable to accumulation of perfect, scientific knowledge Descartes created the conceptual framework and Isaac Newton (1642 Newton ( -1727 completed the metaphor by provmg the exrstence of the giant machme Newtoman physrcs synthesized the scientific work which had preceded it mto one system of understandmg cnth the apparent power to explain the realrties of the human world l2
What a powerful idea -a stable, clockwork umverse which humans have the power to understand and control
The root metaphor of lmearrty leads to a number of assumptions regarding the nature of systems Linear systems are assumed to be self-contamed, or closed A closed system is isolated from external mfluences, contams a fimte number of variables, and thereby is stable and can be made highly eff!cient A second assumption regardmg linear systems is that of predxtabihty, which m turn implies controllabihty The predictabrhty rests on known rules of operatron or behavior If the rules of operation are known, then knowledge of the present condrtron of the system can lead to knowledge of the condluon of the system at any prior or future point m time Knowledge of the rules of operation also mphes that the status of the system can be calculated based upon a hmrted amount of mtral mformation. These assumptrons lead to a view of systems as stable, where change occurs m an orderly manner, and where one avoids surprise by accumulatmg knowledge about the system I3
The pervasiveness of the lmear metaphor is nowhere more apparent than m the use of language -where the stable and orderly are regarded as the norm, and comhtions other than the stable and orderly are m&cated by negation -amear, synchronous, megmar, ~.xx~oQc, mhythrmc, etc Ad&tionally, the machme analogy predommates, especially when descnbmg positive outcomes -the "well-orled machme" "fires on all Colonel Warden says we "must demysti@ war,'226 which he explams by asserting that the NapoleomclClause~tzmn formulations of fog, fnction, and the importance of morale are no longer valid He goes on to say that morale, fog, and fiction have not dsappeared, but that "we can now put them m a &stmnct category, separate from the physical we can thmk broadly about war m the form of an equation (physical) x (morale) = outcome "27 Tins relationship holds true, he says, because mdividual fighters are now dependent on physical thmgs and technolo,y, without winch they cannot affect the enemy As a result, "the physical side of the enemy is, m theory, perfectly knowable and predictable . . the morale side is beyond the realm of the predictable Our war efforts, therefore, should be duected pnmanly at the physical side " He further asserts that "'the advent of anpower and accurate weapons has made it possible to destroy the physrcal side of the enemy yY28 Thus, if you destroy the physical side, you achieve victory without the necessity of copmg with the unknowable, nonlmear aspects of war Warden's extreme view makes clear the appeal of separatmg the linear and nonlmear If such a separation is possible, then war IS susceptible to scientific analysis and understandmg, and victory is predicated upon supenonty m weapons The idea that the linear aspects of war are knowable exerts an uresisubly seductrve effect and makes this notion the most powerful of the three drivers toward lmear thmkmg
The second of the three IS the importance of technology m modem warfare and the nature of its influence That influence takes two distmct forms, seemingly opposite m nature, but both dnvmg m&ary thmkers toward lmeanty Throughout history, technology has served as a means of increasing the lethality of warfare, to the pomt that nuclear weapons provided the capability to kill millions of people mdiscnmmately with a s handful of "bullets " Today, that quest for lethal@ has become, rather than a quest to loll more of the enemy, a quest to "kill" l-ns ability to act as a coherent military force -by removmg the ability of leaders to control their forces, by creating a pace of operations which outstrms the enemv's abilrtv to react. and bv subrectmg: hts troons to a whulwmd of actron that physically and psychologrcally drslocates them In Copzng wzth the Bounds, Specuiatrons on Nonlrnearlty m Mllltary Afam, National Defense Umversity faculty member Tom Czerwmski has clzumed that such "overwhelmmg force can sigmficantly lmeanze conflict 'Y2g In effect, it 1s assumed the lethal technology ehminates, or reduces srgmficantiy, the nonlinear aspects of war -at least on the wmmng side At the same tie, however, advances in rmhtary technology have created an almost completely opposrte trend which also produces linear thinkmg about warfare In addrtton to creatmg "overwhelmmg" force, military technology has become focused, to a large degree, on the ever-more precise rdentrfkauon of targets and delivery of weapons to a&eve precise ends wrth hnnted means, wlnle lnmtmg casualtres and collateral damage Inherent m thrs conceptuahzatron 1s lmear thmkmg regarding weapons as inputs and effects as outputs m a grand scheme of mrhtary action as calculus Thrs emphasis on precrslon also helps rllustrate the thud drrver toward nonlinear thmkmg -the nature of modem hmtted war. Modem warfare, especrally as the Uruted States has chosen to conduct rt recently, 1s hmtted to a srgmficant degree These lumtauons have included 1mxt.s on ends, ways, and means Limited war leads to an emphasis on the linear side of warfare because the very idea of lmnts tmphes measurabrhty and control -control over mputs, outcomes, battles and engagements, m weapons, and ultunately, control over one's enemy w&out the need for total destructron Imphcrt m the need for control 1s the need for a hrgh degree of ratronalrty, and thus lmearrty, on the part of both sides m the con&t The ultunate reahty, however, is that the separation of the linear and the nonlmear IS a false drchotomy -and IS, essentially, rmposstble As Professor James Rosenau asserts, "human tiarrs have both linear and nonlinear dunenstons, and whrle there IS a range of condrttons m which the latter dunensrons are inoperative , It 1s not known when or where the no&near drmensrons wrll anpear and trigger mexphcable feedback mechamsms 3o (emphasis added) In the realm of combat, there 1s an essenual "nature of war" that IS not drvtsrble mto its consutuent systems Combat 1s a qumtessential example of a human actlvrty greater than the sum of its parts, and war ceases to be war If rt IS 'taken apart " Thus, although rt might be acceptable for a begmmng student of m&ary theory to "srmphfy the equauon" (1 e Given the existence of complex adapve systems as a foundation, there are four key prermses of complex@ theory The first IS selfargamzation and emergent
properties As agents of a complex adaptive system build relationstips w& each other, they form recurrmg patterns of behavior whch form an orderly whole As thrs process occurs, new properties or attributes appear For example, when the human brain exhibits mtelhgence, it is also exhibiting self-orgamzauon and emergence The mdrvidual charactenstics of the components of the bram (neurons, dendrites, neurochemmal transmitters) do not account for the extstence of intelligence Yet, as the bram grows and matures, the components organize themselves so as to be able to control the functions of the human body, and the quality of mtelhgence emerges from that self-organized., complex system The second premise is the existence of adaptation and co-evolution The strategic elements that effect the use of engagements may be classified mto various types It would however be disastrous to try to develop our understandmg of strategy by analyzing these factors m isolation, since they are usually mterconnected m each m&ary action m manifold and mtncate ways we shall continue to examme the picture as a whole the idea we wish to convey will always have its ongms m the xmpressions made by the sum total of the phenomena of war 4o
A modem day systems-cum-rrnhtary theonst could not have stated the case for the apphcation of complexity theory to military thought any better Even when "no plan survrves desmn, lead to self-orgamzatron and emergent properttes first contact wrth the enemy," the chaos of mdrvrdual engagements and battles resolves mto self-orgamzed actrvrty toward a designated missron obJectWe -albeit wrth varymg degrees of success Leadership is arranged m a hierarchy so that if one leader is lost, another is ready to step mto place Umts are tramed to mamtam cohesion and mission focus m spite of losing contact with higher headquarters or adjacent umts Combined arms warfare relies upon the emergent synergy between mfantry, armor, artillery, and au in creating an outcome greater than the sum of the parts 42 Emergence is also evident m warfare m that tactical events determme outcomes at the operational and strategrc levels, but those outcomes cannot be predicted based on outcomes of mlvidual tactical engagements or as the sum of several tactical engagements Strategic and operational outcomes, m turn feedback mto tactical engagements 43
Secondly, m&ary units and operations, agam bv design, are subject to adaptation and co-evolution The essential elements of structure remam recognizable as service umts are task-organized and Joint task forces are formed m response to mission requu-ements Individual umts are formed and reformed m response to engagements, battles, and casualties The battle space (I e the environment) changes as a result of military activity, and mihtary systems change as a result of changes m the battle space For example, early m a con&t an aenal strike force may contam sigmficant resources devoted to suppression of enemy au defenses As au defenses are destroyed, later strike packages need significantly lesser amounts of those resources Mrbtary operations are also susceptible to punctuated eqtullbnum where long penods of stalemate succumb to s sudden breakthroughs and periods of rapid movement Thirdly, mihtary umts and operations are notably sensitive to the mtluence of small events -a key leader who 1s reassigned, the platoon attack that stops at the wrong time, the cruise missile that hits the wrong target, the cancellation of orders that arrives five minutes too late, the change m orders that reaches the pnmary urut but not the supportmg umt All these seemingly small mcrdents can have effects out of all proportron to the mdrvrdual occurrences Finally, rmluary umts and operatrons are also notably sensrtrve to rmtral conditions -for example, the choice of assumpuons upon which to base a plan, the loss of one key leader an hour before a scheduled attack, the choice of an axts of advance, or decrsron makers recogmze what they cannot know, they should be better equtpped to cope wth the mevttable unforeseen consequences of their acttons In thrs case, recogmzmg that they cannot know whether the generator wrll work may lead decrslon makers to an assessment of the potential "costs" of rts failure As a consequence, they might prepare a public affans "damage control" plan to assuage the effects, or they nught be able to assess the potentral reactron of f?tends and allies ahead of time Ultmrately, they might cancel the stnke or choose to stnke a tierent target American forces from Somalia after a relatively small number of casualties The public reaction was not based solely on the number of casualties, but also on the perceived lack of clarity m US mvolvement, the manner of the soldiers' deaths and the public defihng of then bodies, the lack of heavy weapons, and the perceived "over-mfluence" of the UN on US pohcy None of these factors is quantifiable nor are they susceptrble to simphficatlon or simplistic analysts
The Technologzcal Dzmenszon According to Echevama, the technological dimension is now pervasive m its influence on all the other dimensions and m all levels of war,jg and is thus worthy of a more extended discussion It is also a dimension m which the mfIuence of the linear metaphor is subtly pervasive and its most negative effects are largely unrecognized The linear metaphor is most evident in the application of technolo,T toward the effectrve ehmmatron of fog and fktron and toward the quest for ever-more precise weapons and weapon effects, especmlly at the strategrc level Although most mrhtary thmkers would agree that total elnnma~on of fog and frtctron IS rmposslble, the Qscussion m the second sectron of tis paper shows that the depth of analysrs and understandmg of these factors 1s lackmg, pa.rtrcularly wrth regard to the effects of technology Eliot Cohen has provrded a useful senes of observatrons He notes that as technology allows an ever-mcreasmg pace of operations, snnple tune shortages result m mcreased pressure on planners, decision makers, and executors wmch, among other possible errors, may lead to mtsmterpretatlons -of messages, photos, intercepts, etc Cohen goes on to point out that mformatron gathered and presented electromcally IS perceived as tmambrguous when, m fact, rt cmes many embedded ambrgumes The technology also slfis and interprets mformatron based on embedded assumptrons which means the mformatton presented IS essentrally an abstractron of reality Furthermore, the technologes that permit all-weather, 24-hour mrhtary operations mean leaders and executors are mcreasmgly affected by fatigue Other effects of technology include an almost mevrtable drwe toward centrahzatron because rear commanders have the same or even more mformatron than on-scene leaders, the negative unphcatrons of trammg m a "cyberworld" rf the real world does not match the trammg environtllent, and the creation of scarce, hrgh-tech mformatron gathering machmes as the most fucrattve targets for a potential enemy 5o
On the surface, the increased use of technology would seem to make warfare rnore lmear, thus valldatmg the old root metaphor Cohen's observatrons show how technology introduces a sign&ant nonlmear complex component, wnh greater effects because they go unrecogmzed Technology may be the direct cause of nonlmear events such as errors m execution, incorrect assessments of enemy actions, or failures to commumcate effectively, instead of the solution to such problems as it 1s often touted Subtle ambtgultres are introduced when analog mformauon 1s converted to digital "packagmg" for transmrssion and is then re-packaged as graphical interface symbols on a screen -which, to be precrse, must be mterpreted by a user wrth the same mmdset as the mdrvtdual who designed it Additionally, any technology 1s a product of the assumptions of its designers A user who 1s unschooled m those assumpttons may use the technology differently or mcorrectly, provtde mcomplete or improper mputs, or interpret its outputs differently or inaccurately
The lack of validity m the linear metaphor 1s also evident m the attempt to use technology to achieve precise mrhtary outcomes -partrcularly m the use of precision smkes to a&eve strategrc effects wrth less than total destructron of the enemy Agam, on the surface linear reasoning appears to hold sway, but a more rigorous analysis points out its farhngs Strategrc analyst Robert Spulak proposes that for precision strrkes to result m precise strategm outcomes, five criteria must be met First, there must be some fimte number of targets that are m some way crrttcal to the enemy Yet, that number hmges on several complexly related factors -what "level of Pam" the enemy leadership IS Mrlllmg to accept, what level rt can accept and still function, whether enemy mrhtary foices will act even if severed from contact with national leaders, and how one finds the answers to these questtons A second cnterra IS precise knowledge of target locatrons. If there are only a few critical targets, then it may be possible to lude, mob&e, harden, or otherwise protect them, whereas, rf there are a large number, then there are probably too many for strategrc attack to have the desired effect-As the attempt to target Iraqi Scud mrssrles and nuclear/chemlcaVhiologmal facillhes durmg the Gulf War showed, thrs factor IS not a trivial consrdemtron, nor is tt merely a matter of precision mtelligence
The thtrd cnterra is the choice of the number of targets to be engaged Thrs decrston IS essenhally a function of economtcs m that the expense and nature of precrsron weapons drives users toward a "nght-sized" stockprle They cannot afford to buy too many, and rt IS pointless to buy too few The right--srzed stockprle leads to the "GolQlocks Dilemma" m apphcatron -an enemy must be Just rrght for preclsron munmons to be strategcally suffictent cnthout being unnecessary And there IS no way of calculatmg the nght-size before a conflrct ensues or even after a specific enemy IS identified because of the complexltres noted m the first cntena There are, however, two related factors which make nonhneanhes as important m thts drmensron as m all the others First, those strarght-he apprownatrons have always contamed a healthy "fudge factor" of extra matenel so as to have enough on hand m the event of unforeseen circumstances The current move toward "lean loglstrcs" whch drastrcally reduces or ehmmates the excesses m the mrhtary logrstrcs system also makes the system more susceptrble to those unforeseen crrcumstances -whether they ongmate wrthm the logstrcal Qmensron (an an-plane carrying cnttcal supplies crashes on take-off * from an icy runway) or from one of the other dunensrons (operatronal planners change their minds and shrft the main attack axis 200 krlometers to the west) Secondly, and more tmportantly, the greatest source of nonlmeanty m the logrstical dnnension is the fact that the ultunate "consumer" of militarv logrstics is the enemv -who has a vested interest m assunng that the logrstrcs system falls Therefore, the more tightly linear one side makes rts logrstrcs system, the more enticing a target it becomes and the more severe the consequences of a successful attack wrll be The Informatzon Dzmenszon The mformatronal drmension IS also permeated wrth nonlmeanty and complex@ -not only related to the way technology presents mformation, but even more fundamentally, related to the manner m whrch mdrviduals perceive and use iformahon The mformatron needs of a commander are not only different at &fferent levels (strategic, operatronal, tachcd), but are &fferent for each commander because of Qffering levels of experience, comfort wrth ambrgmty or lack of mformahon, or types of mrssrons. These differences result m nonhneanty because Watts drfferenhates between tacrt and explicit knowledge, whrch further supports hrs assertion regarding the maccessrbrhty of mformatron wnhm complex systems Explicit knowledge IS "meamngful mformatron that IS avarlable for entry into data and mformatron systems " It IS susceptible to the drstnbutron problem described above Tacit knowledge, on the other hand, "encompasses the Implicit mformatron and processing capabrhtres that humans carry around msrde them by vntue of then genetrc endowment and brologrcal development, cultural background and upbnngmg, and cumulative mdrvrdual expenences " An example of tacit knowledge is the ability of a company commander to antrcrpate the reaction of one of his platoon leaders to an unexpected combat srtuatron based on hrs knowledge of the mdrvrdual and their shared previous expenences. Thrs knowledge is inaccessrble, or at least not directly accessible, to t&e system as a whole because it IS usually drawn upon only rmphcrtly -often wrthout conscrous thought by the imhvrdual usmg it He extends this concept to the or,oatllzatronal level, rmplymg an aggregation of these consrderahons (I e , development, background, expenence, etc ) w&m a unit composed of mulhple mdrvrduals, wrth the aggregation often proving dysfunctional because each factor IS different for each mdrvrdual Watts concludes that the problem of tacit tiormatron IS also mtractable.
Thus, the nonlmeantres of the mformahonal drmenslon are permanent because of the existence of dispersed and tacit mformauon 56
The Dzmenszons of Force and Operatzons The operational dnnensron and the dimension of force are closely related since both deal with the physical application of combat power The nonlmeanties of the operahonal drmensron are best summanzed by Clausewrtz War IS not an exercise of the wrll drrected at mammate matter, as 1s the case wrth the mechamcal arts, or at matter which IS ammate but passive and yreldmg, as IS the case wnh the human mmd and emotions m the fine arts In war, the will IS dnected at an ammate object that reacts 57
In other words, the linear metaphor is totally madequate to descnbmg or understandmg the interachons between forces on the field of battle Echevarna describes the Qmenston of force as the degree of lethality and vrolence applied to confhct He regards it as an emergmg dimension worthy of independent analysts because of the contmumg development of non-lethal weapons '* The degree of lethality and violence 1s also closely related to the quest for precision strikes directed In the interest of explonng new Ideas, the followmg "nonlmear proposrhons" can serve an rmhal effort at conshuctmg a foundation for a nonbnear theory of war Frost, war is a human endeavor, and humans are complex adaptive systems Human cogmhve hmtts and sheer physrcal frailties, coupled wrth the responsrbrhhes, pressure, and stress of managmg and conductmg confkct, mean that war will remam a nonlmear achvrty for the foreseeable future Second, war exists in a realm of informational uncertainties Although acqursihon of the most precise mformahon possible IS the goal, the quest for absolute mformahonal certainhes IS fuhle and ~11 lead to a greater vulnerability to surpnse, wasted money, and ulhmately, lives lost Tlnrd, war is structurallv nonlinear The outcome of combat IS fkiamentally unpredrctable because of unforeseeable events and unlmowable mihal condihons This unpredrctabrlrty cannot be overcome "
The lmear metaphor stands m opposrnon to the "rules of nature" -for the natural world 1s a nonlmear world m which complex adaptive systems are the prune actors In an attempt to account for this dichotomy, current milrtary thought makes an artificial separation between the lmear and nonlmear elements of war -and has led practmoners to study the art and science of war as two Qfferent subjects If the above three propositions are true, that separation cannot stand Thus, m changmg the root metaphor, we change the way we analyze and understand war as we know rt now, and how we look at it historically And more unportantly, we change the way we anticipate the future For m a penod of rapid change, it is most important to thmk hohstrcally, rather than m "stovepipes "'l And the no&near metaphor IS a hohstic metaphor It IS important to recognize, however, that a change in the root metaphor does not mean "throurtng out" everythmg wrth even a tamt of lmeanty The change advocated here is much more difficult -keeping the useful lmearitres, addmg the useful no&near ideas, and recogmzing those that are not useful A nonlinear metaphor also does @ mean an end to m&ary planmng, or that money spent on information technolo,T is wasted, or that (begmmng~) students of the mill&try art should not fast be taught the prmcrples of war Again the change is more dn3cult and subtle as tt mvolves not a question of whether we do these things, but rather the questions of why we do them and how The metaphor of lmearny has been 250 years m the makmg, changmg it is not a t&al nor a short-term process We must take the first steps now, by recogmzmg the pervasively lmear foundanon of all our thmkmg, the weaknesses of the hear metaphor when confronted with the reahties of how the world works, and the alternative foundation being exposed for us through the progress m the nonlmear sciences Andrew Ilachmskr of the Center for Naval Analyses has done ground-breakmg work on land warfare and complexity, and provrdes basrc gmdelmes for applying nonlmearny and complex@ theory to nnhtary thmkmg, m general He advocates begummg wrth farmllarrzatron throughout the mrhtary servrces and teachmg the no&near scrences at nnhtary schools He further notes that whrle not all nnlnary leaders are born wrth a Patton's genius, "nonlmear mtumon" IS vrtal and all can benefit from practrce and mstructron m nonlmear analysrs And finally, he asserts that an mter&scrplmary approach 1s necessary Tight specmhzatron IS the realm of lmeansts, whereas an open flow of ideas between specialists results m "cross-fertrhzatton" and "out of the box" thmkmg 72
War IS m every dunenaon a fundamentally nonlinear actrvrty We have rehed on the lmear metaphor to be the root of our understandmg because we had nothmg else The new sciences are now provrdmg the sctennfic and mathematical means to understand the nonlinear nature of mrhtary operatrons To make full use of thrs new capabrhty, we must begm a conscrous movement toward a new root metaphor -a nonlinear metaphor -and thereby develop a more appropriate foundatron for nnhtary theory Ultrmately, we must strrve to be "nonhnear commanders "
The nonlinear commander conquers whrtewater [complexny] by "'readmg" the turbulence, mnnersmg himself m zt, and combrmng technology, orgamzatron, and concept to exploit rt 73 * Thrs nonlmear commander-whitewater kayaker ndes the waves of chaos, systems dynanncs, reactron, and adapt&on that are the stuff of complexrty instead of trying to e lrmnate the waves Thus, complexrty becomes the natural element of all the Qmensrons of m&uy operatrons -as rt always has been. Developmg a nonlinear theory of war wrll be neither an easy nor a short-term task The ml ent of tis paper IS to show why we should do so and how changmg the root metaphor serves that end When military leaders understand and accept the-truth of the quote above, the goal ~11 have been reached
